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Abstract 
Negative commodity price shocks can induce balance of payments crises in resource dependent 
economies. Governments often react by intervening against currency depreciation as, for 
example, in the case of Papua New Guinea in response to the commodity price shocks of 2014. 
We develop an original theoretical model to analyze the balance of payments impact of a 
commodity price shock under alternative exchange rate regimes:  a flexible rate regime and a 
fixed rate regime with foreign exchange rationing. The balance of payments consequences are 
shown to depend on the elasticity of exports and imports with respect to the exchange rate. For 
the Papua New Guinea case, we estimate export elasticities for a variety of commodities (gold, 
silver, copper, oil, coffee, cocoa, copra, copra oil, palm oil, rubber, tea, logs, and marine products) 
as well as for imports. The results indicate that the Marshall-Lerner condition is satisfied for this 
resource-rich economy, implying that exchange rate flexibility may be practicable. We implement 
our calibrated model to conduct a counter-factual simulation and find that with a flexible 
exchange rate, foreign reserves would have been 20 percent higher three years after the shock 
than they were under the actual policy of exchange rate stabilization. In light of this, we argue 
the merits of greater exchange rate flexibility. 
 
JEL Classification Numbers: F31, F32, F41, O13, Q17, Q37 
Keywords: Commodity Exporters, Foreign Exchange Rationing, Papua New Guinea, Marshall-
Lerner Condition, Agriculture, Mining. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The sharp decline in oil prices beginning in mid-2014 had a major impact on commodity 
exporting countries. Low commodity prices have created numerous challenges in resource-rich 
economies, particularly low-income ones. These include lower export revenues, shortages of 
foreign reserves, and weakened fiscal positions. Figure 1 compares foreign reserve holdings in 
the post-2014 period of commodity exporting countries with non-commodity exporting 
countries. The commodity exporting countries experienced an average decrease in reserves of 
more than 20 percent by 2017 due to lower export revenues, while by contrast non-commodity 
exporting countries accumulated reserves. Another common experience of commodity exporting 
countries in the wake of the price shock was import compression owing to a shortage of foreign 
exchange (FX) earnings. As shown in Figure 2, imports of commodity exporting countries 
contracted by roughly 25 percent on average, with no sign of rebound by mid-2017. By contrast, 
imports in non-commodity exporting countries had by this time recovered to their pre-shock 
level. The drop in export revenues and compression of imports of commodity exporters 
undermined overall economic performance leading to a deterioration in fiscal positions, as 
evidenced in Figure 3. From a balanced budget on average in 2013, commodity exporters saw 
fiscal deficits widen to 9 percent of gross domestic product in 2015 and 2016, while the budget 
balance remained stable for non-commodity exporters.  
Figure 1. Foreign Reserves for Commodity and Non-Commodity Exporters, 2014-2017 
 
Note: Countries included in Figures 1-3 comprise of 44 commodity exporting and 129 non-commodity exporting 
countries listed in Appendix A. Commodity exporters are countries included in the IMF’s World Commodity 
Exporters Database. 
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Figure 2. Imports for Commodity and Non-Commodity Exporters, 2014-2017 
 
Figure 3. Budget Balance for Commodity and Non-Commodity Exporters, 2013-2016 
 
Motivated by these stylized facts, we analyze the external adjustment in a resource-rich economy 
following negative commodity price shocks. We develop a theoretical model and implement it 
for the case of Papua New Guinea (PNG), then draw implications for exchange rate policy with an 
eye to interactions with fiscal and monetary policies. 
We construct an original model to compare two exchange rate regimes – a fixed exchange rate 
regime with FX rationing and a flexible exchange rate regime – with regard to their performance 
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following a negative terms-of-trade shock. Adjustment following terms-of-trade shocks has been 
studied in the macroeconomic literature broadly. Open-economy macro models indicate that a 
flexible exchange rate policy can be effective in handling the terms-of-trade shock because the 
nominal exchange rate adjusts immediately to the shock. If the Marshall-Lerner condition is 
satisfied, a depreciation of the home currency affects the trade balance positively. Empirical 
studies have found that this condition holds in many advanced economies. However, it is unclear 
whether the condition holds in a small resource-rich economy because most commodity export 
prices are denominated in U.S. dollars and determined in world markets, and many such 
countries rely on imports to meet a large fraction of domestic demand for intermediate and final 
goods due to under-developed domestic production capacity. These circumstances imply low 
price elasticities for both exports and imports. For our case study of resource exporter PNG, we 
estimate elasticities of various commodity exports with respect to the exchange rate. 
PNG is the largest developing economy among Pacific island nations and one of the most 
resource-rich countries in the world with exports of metals, oil and gas, and commodities from 
agriculture, forestry, and fishery sectors. The country ranks within the world’s top 10 for exports 
of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and tropical logs, and in the top 20 for production of coconut, 
palm oil, cocoa, gold, and coffee (Nakatani 2017a). Further, the country is located next to the 
world’s largest sustainable tuna purse seine fishery and draws 30 percent of the total fish net 
catch among the Parties to the Nauru Agreement. In sum, PNG has abundant natural resources 
for export. Its experience with a very diverse set of commodity exports offers a rich context for 
analyzing export price elasticities. Thus the policy implications generated in this paper should be 
useful not only for PNG but for other resource-rich economies as well. Our model applies 
generally to an economy that produces and exports natural resources and agricultural products 
while importing manufactured goods for consumption. In this situation, negative export price 
shocks cause adjustment on the import side as a result of FX rationing (see, for example, Adler, 
Magud and Werner, 2018). 
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Figure 4. Energy Prices, Exchange Rates, and Foreign Reserves in Papua New Guinea, 2014-
2017 
 
PNG is a commodity exporter facing the challenge of external adjustment in an era of low 
commodity prices. As shown in Figure 4, from 2014 Q2, oil and gas prices declined drastically by 
about 60 percent. Falling exports, coupled with a suspension of production in the mining and 
agricultural sectors due to a major drought,
1
 contributed to nominal exchange rate depreciation 
of the PNG kina relative to the U.S. dollar by 24 percent between June 2014 and May 2016. The 
Bank of Papua New Guinea (BPNG) intervened in the FX market to support the kina, resulting in a 
depletion in foreign reserves. Meanwhile, the real effective exchange rate (REER) was held 
broadly stable. After May 2016, the U.S. dollar exchange rate also stabilized, and foreign reserves, 
too, held steady as the BPNG refrained from intervening in the FX market once mining resumed. 
A salient feature of the PNG experience was that the de facto exchange rate regime changed 
from floating to fixed with FX rationing. As a result of FX rationing, imports in the non-resource 
sector contracted by about $950 million relative to trend due to a lack of access to FX, as shown 
in Figure 5. The policy decision to control the exchange rate and ration FX was motivated by 
concerns about the inflationary impact of currency depreciation and the limited responsiveness 
of net exports to the exchange rate. A theoretical as well as an empirical approach are deployed 
to evaluate this exchange rate policy transformation. 
  
                                                 
1
 The drought brought by El Niño caused water levels to drop, which affected shipping operations and resulted in 
a nine month shut down of Ok Tedi Mine commencing in July 2015. 
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Figure 5. Ratio of Non-Resource Imports to Non-Resource GDP in Papua New Guinea, 2006-
2017 
 
This paper offers two contributions: an original theoretical model of exchange rate policy 
alternatives in the context of a balance of payments (BOP) crisis induced by commodity price 
shocks; and an empirical estimation of PNG’s export and import elasticities with respect to the 
real exchange rate for implementation of the model. Most theoretical papers on BOP crises have 
focused on inconsistent macroeconomic policy mixes, self-fulfilling prophecies, and financial 
frictions leading to problems of maintaining a fixed exchange rate regime with finite foreign 
reserves. These studies have not explicitly investigated the role of commodity price shocks 
leading to BOP crises. At the same time, few papers have explicitly analyzed FX rationing as a 
policy response to a BOP crisis, although a few studies have analyzed the theoretical implications 
of shifting from a flexible to a fixed rate regime under BOP pressures (see van Wijnbergen, 1991). 
In this paper, we extend the Nakatani (2016) model by incorporating agricultural and mining 
sectors, and compare the consequences of a fixed exchange rate regime with FX rationing versus 
a flexible exchange rate regime. Further, using commodity export data, we estimate elasticities of 
various commodities with respect to real exchange rates based on both panel regression 
techniques and cointegration estimation for each export commodity.  
Do commodity exports respond to exchange rates? Yes. Our empirical results of both panel and 
individual commodity regressions indicate that the overall elasticity of exports with respect to the 
real exchange rate is around -0.4. The theoretical model shows that a shortage of foreign 
reserves leads to import compression and reduces consumer welfare. It further shows that 
depreciation of the domestic currency can be a policy tool to mitigate a BOP problem if trade is 
elastic with respect to exchange rates. Using the trade elasticities estimated in the empirical 
exercise, we conduct counter-factual calibration to measure the effects of currency depreciation 
on foreign reserves via increased commodity exports and reduced imports. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review and 
explains key contributions of this paper in the context of the theoretical and empirical literature. 
Section 3 builds a theoretical model to analyze the effects of a commodity price shock on the 
BOP and derives policy implications. Section 4 estimates the effects of real exchange rate 
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adjustments on exports and imports using PNG’s trade volume data. Section 5 simulates the 
effects of currency depreciation on FX for PNG. Section 6 discusses policy implications and 
Section 7 concludes. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND OUR CONTRIBUTIONS 
The adjustment to terms-of-trade shocks has been widely studied in the open-economy 
macroeconomics literature. A typical open-economy macro model suggests that economies with 
more flexible exchange rate regimes exhibit smaller output responses during commodity price 
boom and bust episodes (Céspedes and Velasco 2012). A flexible exchange rate helps stabilize 
the economy in response to terms-of-trade shocks because the nominal exchange rate adjusts 
immediately to the real shock in the presence of other nominal rigidities. Empirically, countries 
with fixed exchange rate regimes have been found to experience large and significant declines in 
real GDP in response to negative terms-of-trade shocks because the real exchange rate 
depreciates slowly (Broda 2004; Edwards and Levy Yeyati 2005). Recent observations for 
commodity exporting countries in Latin America show that real exchange rate depreciation has 
led to an increase in exports and a stronger reduction in imports in connection with expenditure 
switching from foreign goods to domestic goods (IMF 2017a). However, terms-of-trade shocks 
have not been analyzed in the context of BOP crises.
2
 
An adverse commodity-price related terms-of-trade shock can challenge the viability of a (de 
facto) fixed exchange rate regime, although the literature has not focused on such shocks. The 
first-generation models of BOP crises were developed by Krugman (1979). In these models, a 
BOP crisis is caused by an inconsistent fiscal and monetary policy mix under the fixed exchange 
rate regime. The second-generation model was developed by Obstfeld (1996), who analyzed the 
self-fulfilling prophecy caused by the interaction of international investors and the monetary 
authority. The third-generation models focus on various financial frictions and banking 
problems, including debt denominated in foreign currency of firms (Nakatani 2014) and of banks 
(Nakatani 2016), liquidity problems due to collateral constraints (Caballero and Krishnamurthy 
2001), traditional bank runs triggered by stochastic patience of depositors (Chang and Velasco 
2001), and moral hazard problems caused by explicit or implicit government guarantees 
(McKinnon and Pill 1999; Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo 2004). We develop a fourth-
generation model that highlights commodity-price shocks in inducing BOP crises. 
We compare the costs and benefits of fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes in response to a 
negative commodity price shock. We introduce agricultural and mining sectors into a simple 
two-period model originally developed by Nakatani (2016) in a general equilibrium setting for 
this purpose. The analysis highlights that the costs and benefits of currency depreciation depend 
importantly on the elasticity of each component of the BOP with respect to the exchange rate. If 
net trade, especially on the export side, is elastic to exchange rates, the model shows that a 
depreciation of the domestic currency can improve a country’s external position and offer a 
superior response in terms of consumer welfare. To apply this model, we estimate the elasticity 
                                                 
2
 Nakatani (2018a) showed that productivity shocks and risk premium shocks can trigger BOP crises, and 
Nakatani (2018bc) estimated the effects of these shocks on output. 
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of exports with respect to exchange rates using annual commodity export data of PNG. We also 
estimate import elasticity to check the satisfaction of the Marshall-Lerner condition. The model 
further shows that if alternatively a fixed exchange rate policy is chosen, authorities have no 
room to avoid FX rationing in response to the shock, which creates a shadow exchange rate 
premium to be faced by consumers. Although this paper focuses on exchange rate policy 
response during the period of commodity price shock and does not examine the period after the 
policy response, it is worth noting here that if the budget deficit caused by a commodity price 
shock is financed by the monetary authority, the situation resembles the first-generation models 
of BOP crises. 
The empirical contribution of this paper involves estimation of elasticities of export volumes with 
respect to exchange rates based on PNG data and related simulation. The empirical literature has 
reported export elasticities with respect to real exchange rates that range from -0.7 to 0 
depending on the nature of the export goods. For instance, the External Balance Assessment 
(EBA)-lite, which the IMF (2016) developed, uses an export volume elasticity of -0.71 (and an 
import volume elasticity of 0.92). For oil-exporting countries, the price elasticity is much smaller, 
close to zero, because oil exports are priced in U.S. dollars (Behar and Fouejieu 2016). Using 
cointegration methods without including an exchange rate variable, Aba, Aipi and Irau (2012abc) 
studied the price elasticity of coffee, cocoa, and palm oil exports in PNG, and found that results 
are not statistically significant. They stated, however, that the survey conducted by the BPNG 
showed that all producers interviewed had confirmed that exchange rate fluctuations affect the 
kina price they receive and a decline in commodity prices serves as a major disincentive for 
producers. This is because under a currency appreciation, the domestic producer price of a 
commodity becomes more expensive relative to foreign competitors, and the profits decrease in 
domestic currency, and vice versa. In our own discussions with the PNG Department of 
Agriculture and Livestock, officials corroborated that a higher producer price in domestic 
currency provides important incentives to crop producers and that the exchange rate plays a 
major role in determining the domestic prices received by producers. In fact, Nkang, Abang, 
Akpan and Offem (2006) found that the short-run elasticity of cocoa exports in Nigeria with 
respect to the real producer price is -0.5. Thus, statistically significant elasticities of those 
agricultural exports would appear plausible for PNG as well. However, no empirical study has 
estimated export volume elasticity with respect to exchange rates using PNG data. So this paper 
estimates PNG’s exchange rate elasticities and uses the results to apply our theoretical model for 
counter-factual policy simulation. 
3. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
In this section, we develop a theoretical model to derive implications for exchange rate policy in 
a resource-rich economy. The model is designed to study the mechanism through which the 
commodity price shock leads to a BOP crisis, and to yield policy implications for managing 
external adjustment. Specifically, we compare two exchange rate policies – an FX intervention 
policy versus a flexible exchange rate policy – to handle the external adjustment required after a 
permanent negative commodity price shock occurs. 
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3.1 Model 
The model involves two-periods with three agents: firms, households, and a government that 
operates a central bank. There are two types of firms, agricultural and mining, both of which are 
owned by the government and foreign investors. The timing of events is summarized as follows. 
Initial prices are given prior to the shock, based on which all agents have chosen their actions. 
Then, in the first period an unanticipated negative commodity price shock occurs creating a 
shortage of FX by reducing export revenues. Concurrently, only the government can respond by 
choosing either to sell foreign reserves into the FX market or to allow flexibility in the exchange 
rate, so as to satisfy all equilibrium conditions for the first period. In the second period, the other 
two types of agents, households and firms, then choose their actions in response to the 
government policy adopted in the first period. 
3.1.1 Firms 
3.1.1.1 Agricultural Firms 
Agricultural firms sell their products to both foreign and domestic consumers, and maximize 
their profits net of wage payments to employees: 
П𝑡
𝑎 = (1 − 𝜏)𝑃𝑡
𝑎,𝑓𝐸𝑡𝑌𝑡
𝑎,𝑓 + 𝑃𝑡
𝑎,𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑎,𝑑 − 𝑊𝑡
𝑎𝐿𝑡
𝑎                                       (1) 
where 𝑌𝑡
𝑎,𝑓
 and 𝑌𝑡
𝑎,𝑑 are the amounts of agricultural goods sold to foreign consumers and to 
domestic households respectively; 𝐿𝑡
𝑎 is the number of employees in the agricultural sector; 𝜏 is 
the tax rate; 𝑃𝑡
𝑎,𝑓
 is the price of agricultural export goods in foreign currency; 𝑃𝑡
𝑎,𝑑 is the price of 
agricultural domestic goods in domestic currency; 𝐸𝑡 is the nominal exchange rate (the price of 
foreign currency in terms of domestic currency); and 𝑊𝑡
𝑎 is the nominal wage in the agricultural 
sector. Agricultural firms satisfy the following production function:  
𝑌𝑡
𝑎 = 𝐴𝑡
𝑎𝐿𝑡
𝑎                                                                  (2) 
where 𝐴𝑡
𝑎 is total factor productivity; and 𝑌𝑡
𝑎 is the total output of agricultural firms sold on 
foreign and domestic markets: 
𝑌𝑡
𝑎 = 𝑌𝑡
𝑎,𝑓 + 𝑌𝑡
𝑎,𝑑 .                                                             (3) 
Agricultural export goods are subject to the following demand function defined on the real 
exchange rate (𝑅𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡𝑃𝑡
𝐹 𝑃𝑡⁄ ) and foreign income:  
𝑌𝑡
𝑎,𝑓 = 𝑌𝑡
𝑎,𝑓,𝐷(𝑅𝑡 , 𝑌𝑡
𝐹)                                                           (4) 
where 𝑃𝑡
F is the price in foreign countries; 𝑃𝑡 = 𝜗
𝑎𝑃𝑡
𝑎,𝑑 + 𝜗𝑚𝑃𝑡
𝑚𝐸𝑡 + 𝜗
𝑖𝑃𝑡
𝑖𝐸𝑡 is a domestic price 
index, in which each goods is multiplied by its share in the consumption basket characterized 
later by household behavior; and 𝑌𝑡
𝐹 is income in foreign countries. The first order condition of 
the optimization problem of agricultural firms yields: 
𝐴𝑡
𝑎 = 𝑊𝑡
𝑎 𝑃𝑡
𝑎,𝑑⁄ ,                                                               (5) 
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which implies that employment in the agricultural sector is determined at the level where the 
marginal product in terms of agricultural goods equals the real wage. Agricultural firms pay 
dividends to both the government and foreign investors as elaborated later. 
3.1.1.2 Mining Firms 
Mining firms have a similar profit function. Variables are given analogously to the agricultural 
firms with the superscript 𝑚 denoting mining, with the following differences. First, the price of 
mining goods, 𝑃𝑡
𝑚 is determined in foreign currency (e.g., oil or LNG price is in U.S. dollars) and is 
the same for both domestic and foreign consumers. Second, the government can tax both export 
goods and domestically sold mining goods. Third, mining firms invest, 𝐼𝑡, in physical capital, 𝐾𝑡, 
each period and make interest payments at a rate, 𝑖𝑡, in the following period. Fourth, mining 
firms issue foreign currency denominated bonds, 𝐵𝑡, on which foreign investors earn interest at 
rate, 𝑖∗, assumed constant over time. Thus, mining firms maximize profits given as: 
П𝑡
𝑚 = (1 − 𝜏)𝑃𝑡
𝑚𝐸𝑡(𝑌𝑡
𝑚,𝑓 + 𝑌𝑡
𝑚,𝑑) − 𝑊𝑡
𝑚𝐿𝑡
𝑚 − 𝐼𝑡 − 𝑖𝑡−1𝐾𝑡−1 − (1 + 𝑖
∗)𝐸𝑡𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝐸𝑡𝐵𝑡,        (6) 
subject to the Cobb-Douglas production function: 
𝑌𝑡
𝑚 = 𝐴𝑡
𝑚(𝐾𝑡)
∝(𝐿𝑡
𝑚)1−∝,                                                        (7) 
where 𝑌𝑡
𝑚 is the total output of mining firms sold on both foreign and domestic markets: 
𝑌𝑡
𝑚 = 𝑌𝑡
𝑚,𝑓 + 𝑌𝑡
𝑚,𝑑.                                                           (8) 
The equation of motion for capital can be written as: 
𝐼𝑡 = 𝐾𝑡 − (1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑡−1,                                                         (9) 
where 𝛿 is the depreciation rate. The foreign demand for mining goods is characterized by a 
similar function to that for agricultural goods:   
𝑌𝑡
𝑚,𝑓 = 𝑌𝑡
𝑚,𝑓,𝐷(𝑅𝑡, 𝑌𝑡
𝐹).                                                      (10) 
The first order conditions of mining firms hold that the marginal product of labor equals the real 
wage rate (in domestic currency) in the mining sector: 
(1−∝)𝐴𝑡
𝑚(𝐾𝑡 𝐿𝑡
𝑚⁄ )∝ = 𝑊𝑡
𝑚 {(1 − 𝜏)𝑃𝑡
𝑚𝐸𝑡}⁄ ,                                       (11) 
and the marginal product of capital equals the real interest rate plus the depreciation rate: 
∝ 𝐴𝑡
𝑚(𝐿𝑡
𝑚 𝐾𝑡⁄ )
1−∝ = (𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿) {(1 − 𝜏)𝑃𝑡
𝑚𝐸𝑡}⁄ .                                      (12) 
3.1.2 Households 
Households maximize the utility function 𝑈(𝐿𝑡
𝑎 , 𝐿𝑡
𝑚, 𝑌𝑡
𝑎,𝑑 , 𝑌𝑡
𝑚,𝑑 , 𝑌𝑡
𝑖), where 𝑈𝐿𝑡𝑎 < 0, 𝑈𝐿𝑡𝑚 < 0, 
𝑈𝑌𝑡
𝑎,𝑑 > 0, 𝑈𝑌𝑡
𝑚,𝑑 > 0, and 𝑈𝑌𝑡𝑖 > 0, subject to the following budget constraint: 
𝑃𝑡
𝑎,𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑎,𝑑 + 𝑃𝑡
𝑚𝐸𝑡𝑌𝑡
𝑚,𝑑 + 𝑃𝑡
𝑖𝐸𝑡𝑌𝑡
𝑖 + 𝐼𝑡 ≤ 𝑊𝑡
𝑎𝐿𝑡
𝑎 + 𝑊𝑡
𝑚𝐿𝑡
𝑚 + 𝑖𝑡−1𝐾𝑡−1 + 𝐺𝑡 ,                 (13) 
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where 𝑌𝑡
𝑖 is the amount of the imported consumer good; 𝑃𝑡
𝑖 is its import price in foreign currency; 
and 𝐺𝑡 is a government lump-sum transfer to households. The first order conditions of the 
household’s problem yield the following equations that contain the Euler equation: 
𝑈𝑌𝑡
𝑎,𝑑 𝑈𝑌𝑡𝑖⁄ = 𝑃𝑡
𝑎,𝑑 (𝑃𝑡
𝑖𝐸𝑡),⁄                                                      (14) 
𝑈𝑌𝑡
𝑚,𝑑 𝑈𝑌𝑡𝑖⁄ = 𝑃𝑡
𝑚 𝑃𝑡
𝑖⁄ ,                                                        (15) 
𝑈𝐿𝑡𝑎 𝑈𝑌𝑡
𝑎,𝑑⁄ = − 𝑊𝑡
𝑎 𝑃𝑡
𝑎,𝑑⁄ ,                                                     (16) 
𝑈𝐿𝑡𝑚 𝑈𝑌𝑡
𝑚,𝑑⁄ = − 𝑊𝑡
𝑚 (𝑃𝑡
𝑚𝐸𝑡),⁄                                                  (17) 
𝛽 𝑈𝑌𝑡+1
𝑎,𝑑(1 + 𝑖𝑡 − 𝛿)𝑃𝑡
𝑎,𝑑 (𝑈𝑌𝑡
𝑎,𝑑𝑃𝑡+1
𝑎,𝑑)⁄ = 1,                                         (18) 
where 𝛽 is the discount factor. 
3.1.3 Government 
The government satisfies the budget constraint and non-negativity constraint of foreign reserves. 
The government budget redistributes revenues yielded by the country’s mining and agricultural 
resources to citizens. The budget constraint sets tax revenues plus dividends from state 
ownership (𝛼𝑎 is the fraction of dividends of agricultural firms paid to foreign investors with 
1 − 𝛼𝑎 the fraction paid to the government; the same notation 𝛼𝑚 applies to mining firms) equal 
to transfers to households. There is a one period lag for the payments of taxes and dividends 
since corporate taxes are based on profits in the previous year. Thus, commodity price shocks 
affect government revenue in period 2: 
𝜏(𝑃𝑡−1
𝑎,𝑓𝐸𝑡−1𝑌𝑡−1
𝑎,𝑓 + 𝑃𝑡−1
𝑚 𝐸𝑡−1𝑌𝑡−1
𝑚 ) + (1 − 𝛼𝑎)П𝑡−1
𝑎 + (1 − 𝛼𝑚)П𝑡−1
𝑚 = 𝐺𝑡 .                (19) 
The non-negativity constraint on foreign reserves is satisfied:
3
 
𝐹𝑡 ≥ 0.                                                                   (20) 
3.1.4 Money Market 
The interest rate on foreign currency bonds and capital satisfy the following uncovered interest 
parity condition
4
 since firms are indifferent between borrowing from abroad and borrowing from 
domestic households: 
1 + 𝑖1 = (1 + 𝑖
∗) 𝐸2
𝑒 𝐸1⁄ ,                                                      (21) 
                                                 
3
 Monetary policy variables were dropped from the original working paper version of Nakatani (2017a) to simplify 
the structure of the model and focus on exchange rate policy.  
4
 We use the uncovered interest parity condition rather than the covered interest parity condition because the 
forward market is not well-developed in PNG.  
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where 𝐸2
𝑒 is the expected nominal exchange rate in period 2. If a parallel exchange rate market 
exists, the exchange rate in this market exhibits a higher premium under FX rationing, implying a 
shadow exchange rate, ?̃?𝑡. Thus, if a parallel market emerges under FX rationing, the interest 
parity condition holds for this shadow exchange rate, i.e., 1 + 𝑖1 = (1 + 𝑖
∗) 𝐸2
𝑒 ?̃?1⁄ . If 𝑖1 is 
decreased, but 𝐸2
𝑒 is unchanged, then 𝐸1 must increase (kina depreciation). 
3.1.5 Balance of Payments Identity 
The BOP identity in domestic currency is written as: 
𝑃𝑡
𝑎,𝑓𝐸𝑡𝑌𝑡
𝑎,𝑓 + 𝑃𝑡
𝑚𝐸𝑡𝑌𝑡
𝑚,𝑓 − 𝑃𝑡
𝑖𝐸𝑡𝑌𝑡
𝑖 = 𝛼𝑎П𝑡
𝑎 + 𝛼𝑚П𝑡
𝑚 + (1 + 𝑖∗)𝐸𝑡𝐵𝑡−1 − 𝐸𝑡𝐵𝑡 + ∆𝐹𝑡𝐸𝑡, 
where ∆𝐹𝑡 = 𝐹𝑡 − 𝐹𝑡−1. Dividing this by 𝐸𝑡, the BOP identity can be rewritten in foreign currency 
(i.e., U.S. dollars) as: 
𝑃𝑡
𝑎,𝑓𝑌𝑡
𝑎,𝑓 + 𝑃𝑡
𝑚𝑌𝑡
𝑚,𝑓 − 𝑃𝑡
𝑖𝑌𝑡
𝑖 = (𝛼𝑎П𝑡
𝑎 + 𝛼𝑚П𝑡
𝑚) 𝐸𝑡⁄ + (1 + 𝑖
∗)𝐵𝑡−1 − 𝐵𝑡 + ∆𝐹𝑡.            (22) 
3.1.6 Equilibrium 
The initial equilibrium is defined as a set of allocations 
{𝐿1
𝑎 , 𝐿1
𝑚, 𝑌1
𝑎 , 𝑌1
𝑎,𝑑 , 𝑌1
𝑎,𝑓 , 𝑌1
𝑚, 𝑌1
𝑚,𝑑 , 𝑌1
𝑚.𝑓, 𝑌1
𝑖 , 𝐾1, 𝐼1, 𝐵1,П1
𝑎 ,П1
𝑚, 𝐹1} and a set of prices and wages as well 
as interest and exchange rates {𝑃1
𝑎,𝑓, 𝑃1
𝑎,𝑑 , 𝑃1
𝑚, 𝑊1
𝑎, 𝑊1
𝑚, 𝑖1, 𝐸1, 𝑅1}, given 
{𝑃0
𝑎,𝑓, 𝑃0
𝑚, 𝑃1
𝐹 , 𝑃1
𝑖 , 𝑌0
𝑎,𝑓 , 𝑌0
𝑚, 𝑌1
𝐹 , 𝐴1
𝑎 , 𝐴1
𝑚, 𝐾0, 𝐵0, 𝐹0,П0
𝑎 ,П0
𝑚, 𝑖0, 𝑖
∗, 𝐸2
𝑒 , 𝜏, ∝, 𝛼𝑎, 𝛼𝑚, 𝜗𝑎, 𝜗𝑚, 𝜗𝑖 , 𝛽, 𝛿} such 
that: 
1.      {𝐿1
𝑎 , 𝐿1
𝑚, 𝑌1
𝑎 , 𝑌1
𝑎,𝑑 , 𝑌1
𝑎,𝑓 , 𝑌1
𝑚, 𝑌1
𝑚,𝑑 , 𝑌1
𝑚.𝑓, 𝐾1, 𝐵1,П1
𝑎 ,П1
𝑚} solve the firms’ problem and satisfy 
Equations (1) - (12); 
2.      {𝐿1
𝑎 , 𝐿1
𝑚, 𝑌1
𝑎,𝑑 , 𝑌1
𝑚,𝑑 , 𝑌1
𝑖 , 𝐾1} solve the household’s problem and satisfy Equations (13) - (18); 
3.      {𝐺1, 𝐹1} solve the government’s problem and satisfy Equations (19) and (20); 
4.      {𝐸1, 𝐹1} satisfy the interest parity condition of Equation (21) and the BOP identity of 
Equation (22). 
The model can be solved with the number of endogenous variables matching the number of 
equilibrium conditions (22 in total). 
3.2 Commodity Price Shocks in Period 1 
The remainder of the paper focuses on the external adjustment to a negative commodity price 
shock. Under negative shocks to commodity prices such that 𝑃1
𝑎,𝑓,𝑠 < 𝑃1
𝑎,𝑓
 and 𝑃1
𝑚,𝑠 < 𝑃1
𝑚, where 
superscript “𝑠" denotes a variable after a shock, the BOP identity in U.S. dollars (22) will be 
𝑃1
𝑎,𝑓,𝑠𝑌1
𝑎,𝑓 + 𝑃1
𝑚,𝑠𝑌1
𝑚,𝑓 − 𝑃1
𝑖𝑌1
𝑖 =
(𝛼𝑎𝜋1
𝑎,𝑠+𝛼𝑚𝜋1
𝑚,𝑠)
𝐸1
+ (1 + 𝑖∗)𝐵𝑡−1 − 𝐵𝑡 + ∆𝐹1
𝑠.               (23) 
Subtracting (23) from (22), we find that negative commodity price shocks reduce foreign reserves 
by: 
𝐹1−𝐹1
𝑠 = ∆𝑃1
𝑎,𝑓𝑌1
𝑎,𝑓 + ∆𝑃1
𝑚𝑌1
𝑚,𝑓 − (1 − 𝜏)(𝛼𝑎∆𝑃1
𝑎,𝑓𝑌1
𝑎,𝑓 + 𝛼𝑚∆𝑃1
𝑚𝑌1
𝑚)/𝐸1,             (24) 
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where ∆𝑃1
𝑎,𝑓 ≡ 𝑃1
𝑎,𝑓 − 𝑃1
𝑎,𝑓,𝑠
 and ∆𝑃1
𝑚 ≡ 𝑃1
𝑚 − 𝑃1
𝑚,𝑠. 
3.3 Exchange Rate and FX Intervention Policy in Period 1 
We discuss four exchange rate and FX intervention policy options in response to the BOP crisis 
caused by the negative commodity price shocks. The focus is strictly on the effect of shocks on 
the external balance, any effects on domestic activity being delayed to period 2 (e.g., the tax 
revenue shortfall materializes in period 2). An equilibrium in period 1 is defined on the 
government’s FX market policy response. 
3.3.1 Fixed Exchange Rate with No Intervention: Severe FX Rationing 
If the central bank does not sell reserves into the FX market and does not change the exchange 
rate and the interest rate in the face of shocks, import volume must decrease by the following 
amount: 
𝑌1
𝑖 − 𝑌1
𝑖,𝑠 =
∆𝑃1
𝑎,𝑓
𝑌1
𝑎,𝑓
+∆𝑃1
𝑚𝑌1
𝑚,𝑓
−(1−𝜏)(𝛼𝑎∆𝑃1
𝑎,𝑓
𝑌1
𝑎,𝑓
+𝛼𝑚∆𝑃1
𝑚𝑌1
𝑚) 𝐸1⁄
𝑃1
𝑖 .                             (25) 
If importers do not reduce orders, some orders are unmet and become backlogs. In this case, 
imports are fully compressed by the shortage of FX. The equilibrium condition (22) is replaced by 
(23) and the amount of imports is equivalent to 𝑌1
𝑖,𝑠 in period 1. 
3.3.2 Fixed Exchange Rate with Partial Intervention: Modest FX Rationing 
If the central bank sells an amount ∆𝐹1
∗ of reserves in the FX market without changing the 
exchange rate, the amount of import compression is smaller than under the previous case (25): 
𝑌1
𝑖 − 𝑌1
𝑖,∗ =
∆𝑃1
𝑎,𝑓
𝑌1
𝑎,𝑓
+∆𝑃1
𝑚𝑌1
𝑚,𝑓
−(1−𝜏)(𝛼𝑎∆𝑃1
𝑎,𝑓
𝑌1
𝑎,𝑓
+𝛼𝑚∆𝑃1
𝑚𝑌1
𝑚) 𝐸1⁄ −∆𝐹1
∗
𝑃1
𝑖 .                         (26) 
In this modest FX rationing case, the equilibrium condition (22) is replaced by 
𝑃1
𝑎,𝑓,𝑠𝑌1
𝑎,𝑓 + 𝑃1
𝑚,𝑠𝑌1
𝑚,𝑓 − 𝑃1
𝑖𝑌1
𝑖,∗ =
(𝛼𝑎𝜋1
𝑎,𝑠+𝛼𝑚𝜋1
𝑚,𝑠)
𝐸1
+ (1 + 𝑖∗)𝐵𝑡−1 − 𝐵𝑡 + ∆𝐹1
𝑠 + ∆𝐹1
∗       (27) 
in period 1 and import volume is 𝑌1
𝑖,∗, which is greater than under the previous case of severe FX 
rationing (i.e., 𝑌1
𝑖,∗ > 𝑌1
𝑖,𝑠). 
3.3.3 Fixed Exchange Rate with Full Intervention: No FX Rationing 
If the central bank wants to clear all backlogs of imports, it must sell reserves in the FX market in 
the amount given by (24), which we define as ∆𝐹1
𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙
, to fully offset the loss of FX inflows caused 
by drops in commodity prices. The BOP identity in the equilibrium of period 1 becomes: 
𝑃1
𝑎,𝑓,𝑠𝑌1
𝑎,𝑓 + 𝑃1
𝑚,𝑠𝑌1
𝑚,𝑓 − 𝑃1
𝑖𝑌1
𝑖 =
(𝛼𝑎𝜋1
𝑎,𝑠+𝛼𝑚𝜋1
𝑚,𝑠)
𝐸1
+ (1 + 𝑖∗)𝐵𝑡−1 − 𝐵𝑡 + ∆𝐹1
𝑠 + ∆𝐹1
𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙
 ,         (28) 
so that import volume does not change in the face of commodity price shocks. This policy is 
feasible as long as the government has enough reserves to clear all backlogs of import orders. In 
other words, the central bank should satisfy the non-negativity constraint for foreign reserves 
(20), which becomes in this case: 
𝐹1 − {∆𝑃1
𝑎,𝑓𝑌1
𝑎,𝑓 + ∆𝑃1
𝑚𝑌1
𝑚,𝑓 − (1 − 𝜏)(𝛼𝑎∆𝑃1
𝑎,𝑓𝑌1
𝑎,𝑓 + 𝛼𝑚∆𝑃1
𝑚𝑌1
𝑚,𝑓)} 𝐸1⁄ ≥ 0.              (29) 
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3.3.4 Flexible Exchange Rate with Monetary Autonomy 
Another way to deal with the BOP problem is to use exchange rate flexibility as a shock absorber. 
In the case of a perfectly flexible exchange rate policy, all equilibrium conditions in period 1 are 
the same as under the initial equilibrium except that the exchange rate is set to the market 
clearing level (i.e., 𝐸1
𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑥 > 𝐸1). To analyze the effects of a flexible exchange rate policy, we take 
the derivative of the BOP identity in U.S. dollars (22) with respect to the exchange rate: 
𝑃𝑡
𝑎,𝑓 𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑎,𝑓
𝜕𝐸𝑡
+ 𝑃𝑡
𝑚,𝑓 𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑚,𝑓
𝜕𝐸𝑡
− 𝑃𝑡
𝑖 𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑖
𝜕𝐸𝑡
=
𝜕(𝛼𝑎𝜋𝑡
𝑎+𝛼𝑚𝜋𝑡
𝑚)
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝐸𝑡−(𝛼
𝑎𝜋𝑡
𝑎+𝛼𝑚𝜋𝑡
𝑚)
𝐸𝑡
2 +
𝜕∆𝐹𝑡
𝜕𝐸𝑡
.                    (30) 
Defining 𝜉𝑖 as the elasticity of good 𝑖 with respect to the exchange rate, we can rewrite (30) as 
follows: 
𝑃𝑡
𝑎,𝑓
𝜉𝑎
𝑌𝑡
𝑎,𝑓
𝐸𝑡
+ 𝑃𝑡
𝑚,𝑓
𝜉𝑚
𝑌𝑡
𝑚,𝑓
𝐸𝑡
− 𝑃𝑡
𝑖𝜉𝑖
𝑌𝑡
𝑖
𝐸𝑡
= {𝛼𝑎 (
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝑎
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝐸𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡
𝑎) +𝛼𝑚 (
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝑚
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝐸𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡
𝑚)} /𝐸𝑡
2 + 𝜉∆𝐹
∆𝐹𝑡
𝐸𝑡
.   (31) 
Multiplying both sides by 𝐸𝑡, we get: 
𝜉𝑎𝑃𝑡
𝑎,𝑓𝑌𝑡
𝑎,𝑓 + 𝜉𝑚𝑃𝑡
𝑚,𝑓𝑌𝑡
𝑚,𝑓 − 𝜉𝑖𝑃𝑡
𝑖𝑌𝑡
𝑖 = 𝛤𝑡 + 𝜉
∆𝐹∆𝐹𝑡,                                 (32) 
where: 
𝛤𝑡 =
 𝛼𝑎 {(1 − 𝜏)𝜉𝑎𝑃𝑡
𝑎,𝑓𝑌𝑡
𝑎,𝑓 −
𝑃𝑡
𝑎,𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑎,𝑑−𝑊𝑡
𝑎𝐿𝑡
𝑎
𝐸𝑡
} +
𝛼𝑚 {(1 − 𝜏)𝜉𝑚𝑃𝑡
𝑚,𝑓𝑌𝑡
𝑚,𝑓 −
−𝑊𝑡
𝑚𝐿𝑡
𝑚−(1+𝑖𝑡−1
𝐵 )𝐵𝑡−1+𝐵𝑡+(1−𝛿)𝐾𝑡−1−𝐾𝑡
𝐸𝑡
}.                                     
t represents the increase in dividend payments to foreign investors resulting from higher profits 
due to (i) lower costs due to valuation effects for domestic currency components and (ii) 
increased export volumes. In the empirical analysis to come, we show that both agricultural and 
mining exports increase (𝜉𝑎 > 0 and 𝜉𝑚 > 0) and imports decrease (𝜉𝑚 < 0) when there is a 
currency depreciation. Similarly, the left-hand side of (32) reflects an increase in both agricultural 
and mining exports and a decrease in imports. The total change in the trade account (given by 
the left hand side of (32)) must equal the sum of the increase in dividend payments to foreign 
investors and the change in foreign reserves. 
Monetary policy can also be used to affect exchange rate dynamics under the flexible exchange 
rate regime. The interest parity condition (21) indicates that the central bank can lower the 
interest rate 𝑖1 to induce currency depreciation. In fact, Nakatani (2017b) used panel data on 51 
developing countries, including PNG, and found that a one percent decrease in the policy 
interest rate is associated with a one percent depreciation of domestic currency. This monetary 
easing is appropriate when the economy is hit by negative commodity price shocks because the 
inflation rate is falling and hence there is more room for accommodative monetary policy to 
support the economy.
5
 However, such loose monetary policy and the resulting exchange rate 
depreciation may lead to higher inflation depending on the degree of exchange rate pass-
through, and monetary policy may then need to be tightened after commodity price shocks. 
                                                 
5
 Nakatani (2018a) found that lowering the policy interest rate in fixed exchange rate regimes is associated with 
lower probability of BOP crises. 
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3.4 Welfare Analysis of FX Rationing in Period 1 
To understand the welfare impact of FX rationing, it is helpful to consider the shadow exchange 
rate that households face under import compression. We define the shadow exchange rate, ?̃?𝑡, as 
the exchange rate that would prevail if floating were to determine equilibrium in the imported 
goods market. Figure 6 illustrates the shadow exchange rate in three FX rationing cases, severe, 
modest, or no rationing corresponding to no, partial, and full intervention by the central bank in 
the FX market. Suppose that the supply of imported goods is inelastic to its price; in other words, 
the price of imported goods in foreign currency units is exogenously determined in the global 
market, which is a plausible assumption for a small open economy. Further suppose a linear 
demand curve for simplicity. The initial equilibrium volume of imports is determined at the 
intersection of demand and supply curves, 𝑌1
𝑖. If there is a negative commodity price shock and 
the central bank does not intervene in the FX market, import volume is compressed to 𝑌1
𝑖,𝑠 due to 
the FX shortage. In this case, households face the high shadow exchange rate, ?̃?1
𝑠, for import 
price, 𝑃1
𝑖?̃?1
𝑠, as shown in the figure. Next, if the central bank provides FX partially to offset the 
effect of negative commodity price shocks, imports are higher (𝑌1
𝑖,∗ > 𝑌1
𝑖,𝑠) and the shadow 
exchange rate is lower than in the case without intervention (?̃?1
∗ < ?̃?1
𝑠). Finally, if the full amount 
of FX is supplied by the central bank to meet all import orders determined at the initial 
equilibrium, imports remain unchanged at 𝑌1
𝑖.  
For each case, consumer welfare loss is depicted by the trapezoidal shaded area below the 
demand curve and above the supply curve. The welfare loss is larger under severe FX rationing 
(red shaded area) than under modest rationing (light blue shaded area). This welfare loss is larger 
when the price elasticity of import demand is higher (i.e., steeper slope of demand curve).  
The relationship between the shadow exchange rate premium, which is defined as the shadow 
exchange rate minus the actual exchange rate, and the amount of FX intervention is shown in 
Figure 7. The more the central bank rations FX, the higher the shadow exchange rate premium 
becomes. If a parallel exchange rate market emerges under the FX rationing, the shadow 
exchange rate prevails in this market and the resulting import price inflation is 𝑃1
𝑖?̃?1. 
Figure 6. Welfare Loss by Import Compression       Figure 7. Shadow Exchange Rate Premium 
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3.5 Response of Agents in Period 2 
Let the commodity price shocks be permanent such that commodity prices remain the same in 
period 2 as in period 1; formally, 𝑃2
𝑎,𝑓 = 𝑃1
𝑎,𝑓,𝑠
 and 𝑃2
𝑚 = 𝑃1
𝑚,𝑠. A number of equilibrium conditions 
in period 2 will be affected by the outcome of the price shocks and FX market policy response of 
period 1. 
First, low commodity prices reduce government tax revenues from resource companies, which in 
turn lead to lower government expenditures to maintain the budget balance (Equation [19]). 
Government revenues and expenditures decline by the following amount: 
∆𝐺2 = 𝐸1[𝜏(∆𝑃1
𝑎,𝑓𝑌1
𝑎,𝑓 + ∆𝑃1
𝑚𝑌1
𝑚) + (1 − 𝜏){(1 − 𝛼𝑎)∆𝑃1
𝑎,𝑓𝑌1
𝑎,𝑓 + (1 − 𝛼𝑚)∆𝑃1
𝑚𝑌1
𝑚}]. 
As a result of the reduced government lump-sum transfer, household income declines, and 
therefore so, too, do household consumption and goods imports, as given by Equation (13). 
Note that the response of consumption depends on the duration of commodity price shocks. If 
the negative commodity price shock is permanent as assumed in our model, households are 
forced to reduce consumption faced with permanent income decreases. As such, the negative 
commodity price shock can transmit to the real economy not only through the external 
adjustment process but also through the domestic side via fiscal consolidation. This effect is 
prominent in resource-rich economies because they tend to rely heavily on resource revenues to 
fund their budgets.  
Second, the policy strategy chosen by the central bank in period 1 will have consequences for 
household behavior. Specifically, if the central bank adopts a flexible exchange rate policy, the 
domestic currency will depreciate in period 2 (𝐸2 > 𝐸1) to clear all markets, and households will 
thus face higher domestic prices for imported goods. By contrast, if the authority rations FX 
under a fixed exchange rate (𝐸2 = 𝐸1), the household optimization problem includes the 
following additional constraint on import volume: 
𝑌2
𝑖 ≤ 𝑌2
𝑖,𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 
where 𝑌2
𝑖,𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is the upper limit on imports in period 2, as determined by the degree of FX 
intervention by the central bank. Given the same import price due to the fixed exchange rate, in 
the FX rationing case, the household optimization problem results in a corner solution of 
𝑌2
𝑖 = 𝑌2
𝑖,𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛. An example, assuming constant elasticity of substitution in the household utility 
function, is presented in Appendix B. 
Finally, there is no issuance of bonds (B2 = 0) in period 2 because the model ends in this period. 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
As shown in the theoretical model, if a country has high elasticities of exports and imports with 
respect to exchange rates, currency depreciation can be an effective policy tool for responding to 
negative export price shocks. Conversely, if a country’s exports are not responsive to exchange 
rates, a flexible exchange rate is not a very good solution. For understanding policy options, it is 
important to estimate the elasticities of exports and imports with respect to exchange rates. Thus, 
we now turn to analyzing the effects of exchange rates on PNG’s trade volumes, using 
commodity-level export volume data and overall import volume data. 
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4.1 Export Elasticity 
4.1.1 Time Series Analysis 
We estimate export supply elasticities with respect to real exchange rates for each of PNG’s 
export commodities. We follow a standard approach by regressing export volume on foreign 
demand and REER as the explanatory variables, controlling for supply shocks. Our estimating 
equations are reduced-form versions of Equations (4) and (10). We use the Southern Oscillation 
Index (SOI) to capture supply-side weather shocks (e.g., drought and El Niño), as is common in 
the literature (Cashin, Mohaddes and Raissi 2017). Summary statistics for each variable are shown 
in Table 1.  
Unit root tests indicate the presence of unit roots for most of the variables, as shown in Table 2. 
For this reason, we use cointegration techniques to estimate the elasticity of each commodity 
export with respect to real exchange rates. Cointegration test results shown in Table 3 confirm 
that variables are cointegrated. We use Engel-Granger type cointegration tests for individual 
export commodities. The Engel-Granger test is preferred to the Johansen test because we are 
interested in the cointegration relationship for each individual commodity rather than for the 
system as a whole. The test results in Table 3 show that some commodities (gold, oil, coffee, 
palm oil, and tea) are cointegrated at the 5 percent level of significance. Since it is known that 
Engel-Granger cointegration tests have a tendency to accept the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration, we further test for the presence of cointegration based on an error correction 
model (ECM). We include the error correction term, which is a residual of the long-run 
cointegration equation, in the short-run estimating equation reflected in Table 4. The coefficients 
on the error correction term are negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level for 11 
of 13 export commodities, confirming the presence of cointegration for most commodity exports. 
Results of Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares (DOLS) are shown in Table 5. The DOLS estimator 
corrects for possible simultaneity bias among the regressors and yields long-run elasticity 
estimates (Stock and Watson 1993). The results show that some commodities – copper, cocoa, 
coffee, rubber, tea, and copra oil – have appropriately signed and statistically significant 
elasticities with respect to the real exchange rate. For coffee, the elasticity with respect to REER is 
-0.52, so a 1 percent depreciation of the REER is associated with an increase in the volume of 
exports of about 0.5 percent. The elasticity for cocoa is similar, whereas elasticities for copper, 
copra oil, and tea exceed one. Elasticities with respect to foreign demand are more dominant for 
palm oil and marine products. Our elasticity estimate for palm oil with respect to foreign demand 
is 1.1, which is very close to the result obtained by Aba, Aipi and Irau (2012c). By contrast, the 
ECM results presented in Table 4 imply that only copper responds strongly to the exchange rates 
in the short-run. 
As a robustness check, we further estimate elasticities using another cointegration regression 
method, the Fully Modified OLS (FMOLS) method, which corrects for endogeneity and serial 
correlation (Phillips and Hansen 1990). The results, presented in Table 6, do not substantially 
differ from those reported in Table 5. For example, the elasticity of coffee with respect to the 
REER is -0.72 versus -0.52. In addition, the FMOLS elasticity estimates with respect to foreign 
demand are statistically significant for palm oil, rubber, logs, and marine products. 
 Table 1. Summary Statistics for Export Regression Variables 
Variable Gold Copper Oil Silver Copra Cocoa Coffee 
Palm 
Oil 
Rubber Tea 
Copra 
Oil 
Logs 
Marine 
Products 
REER 
Foreign 
Demand1 
SOI 
Period 
1990-
2015 
1990-
2015 
1992-
2015 
1992-
2015 
1976-
2015 
1976-
2015 
1976-
2015 
1976-
2015 
1990-
2015 
1990-
2015 
1976-
2015 
1990-
2015 
1990-
2015 
1980-
2015 
1980- 
2015 
1980- 
2015 
Unit tons 
thousand 
tons 
thousand 
barrels 
tons 
thousand 
tons 
thousand 
tons 
thousand 
tons 
thousand 
tons 
thousand 
tons 
thousand 
tons 
thousand 
tons 
thousand 
cubic 
meters 
thousand 
tons 
index 
2010=100 
billion 
international 
dollars 
index 
Mean 58.3 165.1 19556  55.6  57.3  36.00  57.2  248.0  3.80  5.65  37.8 2318.0  30.17 108.38 2354.3 -1.54 
Median 58.2 176.9 14534  53.2  58.6  35.35  54.8  238.2  3.75  5.85  38.2 2375.4 17.75  109.76  2295.9 -2.15 
Max 72.8 230.6 45843  92.6 103.5  53.30  85.0  571.9  5.40  9.30  62.0 3868.0  95.40  138.00  4153.2 13.30 
Min 33.6 46.4 5823  35.0  8.4  26.00  37.0  24.5  2.20  1.30  11.1  990.2  1.30  77.27  778.4 -13.08 
Std. Dev. 8.9 48.7 12170  12.2  30.0  7.05  11.6 160.5  0.88  2.00  11.4  849.7  29.00  18.48  998.5 7.15 
Note 1:  Foreign Demand variable is calculated as a weighted average of GDP in major trading partners (Australia, Japan, China, Germany, and Korea) that account for 77 percent 
of PNG’s export market. 
Sources: Export volumes from BPNG; REER and Foreign Demand from the IMF; SOI from the Australian government. 
 
Table 2. Unit Root Tests for Export Regression Variables 
log(Variable) 
Trend for 
Individual 
Gold Copper Oil Silver Copra Cocoa Coffee 
Palm 
Oil 
Rubber Tea 
Copra 
Oil 
Logs 
Marine 
Products 
REER 
Foreign 
Demand 
SOI 
ADF Stat No 
-4.70 
*** 
-0.44 -0.56 -2.93 
* 
-1.41 -2.68 
* 
-3.79 
*** 
-3.71 
*** 
-2.26 1.77 -1.56 -1.93 -1.16 -2.12 -5.21 
*** 
-4.12 
*** 
(0.00) (0.89) (0.86) (0.06) (0.57) (0.09) (0.01) (0.01) (0.19) (1.00) (0.49) (0.31) (0.67) (0.24) (0.00) (0.00) 
ADF Stat Yes 
-4.39 
*** 
-1.00 -8.83 
*** 
-5.44 
*** 
-3.98 
** 
-3.25 
* 
-3.99 
** 
-2.21 -1.36 1.24 -1.61 -2.29 -3.52 
* 
0.97 -1.88 -4.25 
*** 
(0.01) (0.93) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.09) (0.02) (0.47) (0.85) (1.00) (0.77) (0.42) (0.06) (1.00) (0.64) (0.01) 
ADF Stat 
1st diff 
No 
-5.56 
*** 
-4.79 
*** 
-9.33 
*** 
-4.99 
*** 
-7.84 
*** 
-7.21 
*** 
-7.57 
*** 
-8.27 
*** 
-4.87 
*** 
0.01 -5.83 
*** 
-4.48 
*** 
-2.73 
* 
-2.32 -3.75 
*** 
-6.75 
*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.95) (0.00) (0.00) (0.09) (0.17) (0.01) (0.00) 
ADF Stat 
1st diff 
Yes 
-3.82 
** 
-5.02 
*** 
-8.86 
*** 
-3.81 
** 
-7.72 
*** 
-7.26 
*** 
-7.96 
*** 
-4.98 
*** 
-5.36 
*** 
-6.39 
*** 
-6.00 
*** 
-4.10 
** 
-2.73 -6.74 
*** 
-4.48 
*** 
-6.67 
*** 
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.24) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The null hypothesis is the presence of a unit root. P-values are in parentheses. 
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Table 3. Cointegration Tests for Export Variables 
log(Export Goods) Gold Copper Oil Silver Copra Cocoa Coffee Palm Oil Rubber Tea Copra Oil Logs Marine Products 
ADF Stat 
-4.68 
** 
-1.95 -6.43 
*** 
-3.21 -2.42 -3.49 -6.39 
*** 
-4.60 
** 
-3.18 -5.20 
*** 
-3.25 -2.91 -3.99 
* 
(0.02) (0.76) (0.00) (0.22) (0.54) (0.13)- (0.00) (0.01) (0.23) (0.01) (0.19) (0.33) (0.06) 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The null hypothesis is no cointegration. P-values are in parentheses. 
 
Table 4. Error Correction Model (ECM) Estimation Results 
dlog(Export Goods) Gold Copper Oil Silver Copra Cocoa Coffee Palm Oil Rubber Tea Copra Oil Logs Marine Products 
Constant 
0.03 0.04 -0.06 -0.03 -0.13 -0.06 0.08 -0.07 0.03 -0.07 -0.11 -0.09 0.33 
 
(0.07) (0.04) (0.13) (0.08) (0.16) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.28) 
Error Correction Term 
-0.71 
** 
-0.64 
*** 
-0.72 
* 
-0.65 
** 
-0.52 
** 
-0.58 
** 
-1.23 
*** 
-0.93 
*** 
-0.71 
*** 
-0.99 
*** 
-0.41 
** 
-0.27 -0.72 
** 
(0.28) (0.20) (0.41) (0.22) (0.21) (0.27) (0.23) (0.30) (0.22) (0.32) (0.19) (0.22) (0.30) 
dlog(REER) 
0.03 -1.20 
** 
0.46 -0.10 1.03 0.78 
** 
0.29 0.96 
* 
1.21 
*** 
0.53 0.26 0.51 -1.18 
(0.41) (0.54) (0.83) (0.48) (1.13) (0.37) (0.41) (0.48) (0.33) (0.64) (0.64) (0.66) (1.77) 
dlog(Foreign Demand) 
-0.55 -1.74 0.44 0.32 2.62 1.58 -1.72 3.39 
** 
-1.01 0.75 1.62 3.93 -4.76 
(1.61) (2.05) (3.34) (1.94) (3.09) (1.01) (1.12) (1.32) (1.24) (2.42) (1.74) (2.52) (6.77) 
SOI 
-0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 
*** 
0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
R-squared 0.27 0.45 0.20 0.38 0.26 0.35 0.54 0.40 0.65 0.40 0.17 0.22 0.29 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard errors are in parentheses. Bold numbers are statistically significant at the 5% level with expected signs. 
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Table 5. Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares (DOLS) Estimation Results 
log(Export Goods) Gold Copper Oil Silver Copra Cocoa Coffee Palm Oil Rubber Tea Copra Oil Logs Marine Products 
Constant 
6.76 
*** 
14.12 
*** 
21.14 
*** 
6.24 
* 
0.10 4.20 
** 
5.65 
*** 
-2.79 
* 
1.53 17.02 
*** 
19.44 
*** 
-4.67 -32.71 
*** 
(2.30) (3.96) (3.05) (3.43) (5.42) (1.57) (1.38) (1.50) (1.93) (2.63) (4.67) (5.50) (8.17) 
log(REER) 
-0.57 
* 
-1.12 
** 
0.09 0.50 2.11 
*** 
-0.45 
** 
-0.52 
*** 
0.01 -0.67 
** 
-2.08 
*** 
-1.87 
*** 
1.10 -1.58 
(0.29) (0.49) (0.39) (0.44) (0.71) (0.20) (0.18) (0.19) (0.24) (0.33) (0.60) (0.68) (1.01) 
log(Foreign Demand) 
0.00 -0.52 -1.47 
*** 
-0.59 -0.74 
*** 
0.17 0.11 1.10 
*** 
0.38 
* 
-0.73 
** 
-0.90 
** 
0.93 
* 
5.32 
*** 
(0.22) (0.38) (0.31) (0.35) (0.40) (0.12) (0.10) (0.11) (0.19) (0.25) (0.35) (0.53) (0.79) 
R-squared 0.39 0.50 0.89 0.33 0.70 0.72 0.50 0.96 0.74 0.77 0.55 0.60 0.90 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard errors are in parentheses. Bold numbers are statistically significant at the 5% level with expected signs. 
 
Table 6. Fully Modified Ordinary Least Squares (FMOLS) Estimation Results 
log(Export Goods) Gold Copper Oil Silver Copra Cocoa Coffee Palm Oil Rubber Tea Copra Oil Logs Marine Products 
Constant 
5.77 
*** 
17.01 
*** 
26.32 
*** 
5.43 
*** 
2.05 3.95 
** 
7.38 
*** 
-4.81 
*** 
2.88 
* 
17.51 
*** 
16.61 
*** 
-4.11 -32.58 
*** 
(1.20) (2.68) (2.03) (1.82) (4.35) (1.38) (0.97) (1.44) (1.61) (1.83) (2.91) (2.77) (4.73) 
log(REER) 
-0.61 
*** 
-1.30 
*** 
-0.23 0.50 1.40 
** 
-0.30 -0.72 
*** 
-0.11 -0.97 
*** 
-2.26 
*** 
-1.85 
*** 
0.85 
* 
-1.07 
(0.21) (0.46) (0.36) (0.32) (0.66) (0.21) (0.15) (0.22) (0.28) (0.32) (0.44) (0.48) (0.82) 
log(Foreign Demand) 
0.14 -0.76 
*** 
-1.96 
*** 
-0.47 
** 
-0.62 
** 
0.13 0.01 1.40 
*** 
0.37 
** 
-0.69 
*** 
-0.57 
*** 
0.99 
*** 
5.07 
*** 
(0.12) (0.27) (0.23) (0.21) (0.25) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.16) (0.18) (0.17) (0.28) (0.47) 
R-squared 0.24 0.42 0.80 0.22 0.49 0.26 0.36 0.92 0.31 0.62 0.42 0.58 0.86 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard errors are in parentheses. Bold numbers are statistically significant at the 5% level with expected signs. 
  
 4.1.2 Panel Analysis 
Next, we employ panel regression methods to estimate overall elasticities for PNG commodity 
exports. The results of three different panel unit root tests, in which we assume an individual unit 
root process, are shown in Table 7. Although the results indicate that there is a unit root in REER 
(and for some cases in export goods and foreign demand, especially when we include individual 
trends) and that all variables become stationary when taken in first difference, we do not make 
use of first differences when we conduct panel estimation for three reasons. First, to obtain a 
supply elasticity of exports with respect to the real exchange rate, we wish to include the log of 
REER as a regressor. Second, we can compare this overall elasticity estimate with those for 
individual commodities given previously. Third, as a theoretical principle, the real exchange rate 
approximates the equilibrium exchange rate in the long-run. For these reasons, we include the 
log level of REER as an explanatory variable following the standard empirical literature. 
Table 7. Panel Unit Root Tests for Overall Exports 
Test Type Im, Pesaran and Shin  Maddala and Wu Choi 
Trend No Yes No Yes No Yes 
log(Exports) 
-1.24 -0.25 39.04** 30.19 49.39*** 64.03 
(-14.51***) (-13.80***)  (205.05***)  (811.58***) 
log(REER) 
0.43 8.01 14.82 0.33 12.53 0.34 
(-14.41***) (-19.41***) (223.48***) (289.98***) (264.38***) (292.86***) 
log(Foreign 
Demand) 
-4.31*** 1.25 59.27*** 11.54 206.94*** 44.88** 
 (-7.64***)  (101.95***)   
SOI 
-10.84*** -9.04*** 162.79*** 123.21*** 159.78*** 111.60*** 
      
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Test statistics for first differenced variables are in 
parentheses. 
 
Results of panel cointegration tests following Pedroni (1999), presented in Table 8, show that 
three of the seven statistics do not reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 5 percent 
level of significance. An alternative test proposed by Kao (1999) does not reject the null 
hypothesis either. In view of these results, we adopt alternative approaches to panel 
cointegration regression.  
Table 8. Panel Cointegration Tests for Overall Exports 
Pedroni’s Test Statistics 
Panel variance ratio statistic 0.118        (0.453) 
Panel rho-statistic -1.015       (0.155) 
Panel Phillips-Perron statistic -4.926*** (0.000) 
Panel ADF t-statistic -2.647*** (0.004) 
Group mean rho-statistic 0.606        (0.728) 
Group mean Phillips-Perron statistic -6.583*** (0.000) 
Group mean ADF t-statistic -4.143*** (0.000) 
Kao’s Test Statistic 
ADF t-statistic -0.297        (0.383) 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Critical probabilities are in parentheses. 
 
We employ three panel estimation methods. The first is FMOLS for panel cointegration analysis 
which produces asymptotically unbiased estimates for both the standard case without intercepts 
and the fixed effects model with heterogeneous intercepts (Pedroni 2000). The second is the 
fixed effects (FE) model of Driscoll and Kraay (1998) which accommodates cross-sectional inter-
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dependence such as may exist for agricultural and mining commodities. For instance, if cocoa 
prices increase relative to coffee prices, farmers shift production from coffee to cocoa. Similar 
shifts in production can occur in mining because some major mines produce multiple metals. Our 
third method is two-stage least squares (2SLS) with instrumental variables to control for potential 
endogeneity between the exchange rate and exports. We employ the lagged exchange rate as an 
instrument since this variable is strongly correlated with the current exchange rate but is 
exogenous in the sense of being predetermined. Table 9 presents results for each estimation 
method applied both to overall exports and to agricultural exports only. For commodity exports 
overall, the elasticity estimates with respect to the real exchange rate range from -0.30 under the 
FE model (a short-run estimate) to -0.43 under the FMOLS model (a long-run estimate). For 
agricultural exports, the elasticity estimates with respect to the real exchange rate range from -
0.53 under the FE model to -0.71 under the 2SLS model. Thus, our panel regression analyses 
confirm that PNG commodity exports respond elastically to the real exchange rate, with the 
response slightly higher for agricultural commodities than for primary commodities overall. 
Table 9. Panel Regression Results for Overall and Agricultural Exports 
Estimation Method FMOLS Driscoll and Kraay FE 2SLS 
Commodities Overall Agricultural Overall Agricultural Overall Agricultural 
Constant ― ― 
1.998*** 2.709*** 2.311*** 3.233*** 
(0.414) (0.565) (0.559) (0.602) 
log(REER) 
-0.428*** -0.674*** -0.296** -0.533** -0.421** -0.709*** 
(0.128) (0.153) (0.126) (0.210) (0.213) (0.220) 
log(Foreign Demand) 
0.322** -0.012 0.059* -0.014 0.051 -0.036 
(0.152) (0.027) (0.032) (0.032) (0.038) (0.035) 
SOI ― ― 
0.002** 0.003** 0.002 0.003* 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 379 227 384 232 379 227 
R-squared 0.98 0.89 0.29 0.55 ― ― 
First-Stage Regression: 
log(REER(-1)) 
― ― ― ― 
0.951*** 0.963*** 
(0.026) (0.034) 
F Statistic ― ― ― ― 482.61*** 337.32*** 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard errors are in parentheses. Bold numbers are 
statistically significant at the 5% level with expected signs. Previous year’s REER is used as an instrument in 2SLS 
estimation. 
 
As a further check, we compute the weighted average of export elasticities with respect to the 
real exchange rate for the individual commodities, where the weights are export shares. We 
obtain a value of -0.43 from the DOLS estimates (Table 5) and -0.51 for the FMOLS estimates 
(Table 6). Comparing these estimates with those in Table 9, we conclude that our estimates of 
overall export elasticity with respect to the real exchange rate are robust at around -0.4. 
 
4.2 Import Elasticity 
Next, we estimate import volume as a function of the REER controlling for domestic demand. 
Official PNG data do not contain a measure for real import volume. We therefore deflate the 
nominal value of imports using the import deflator from the IMF’s Global Economic Environment 
database to derive a measure. Domestic demand is taken as real GDP minus exports (IMF 2015). 
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Our real GDP series comes from the PNG National Statistical Office through 2014, with the IMF 
estimate used for 2015. Summary statistics are shown in Table 10. 
Table 10. Summary Statistics for Import Regression Variables 
Variable Imports REER 
Domestic 
Demand
1 
Period 1990-2015 1990-2015 1990-2015 
Units 2005=100 2010=100 
million kina 
constant price 
Mean 146.5 100.9 15244 
Median 129.7  100.4  2860 
Max 299.6  131.0  44418 
Min 97.5  77.3  974 
Std. Dev. 54.4  15.8  17296 
Source BPNG, IMF IMF NSO, IMF 
Note 1: Domestic Demand variable is calculated as real GDP minus exports. 
 
Unit root test results presented in Table 11 show that for none of the variables can we 
consistently reject the null hypothesis of a unit root. Thus, we use cointegration techniques to 
estimate the import equation. 
Table 11. Unit Root Tests for Import Regression Variables 
log(Variable) 
Trend for 
Individual 
Imports REER 
Domestic 
Demand 
ADF Stat No 
-2.02 -2.23 -0.72 
(0.28) (0.20) (0.82) 
ADF Stat Yes 
-2.59 0.20 -2.25 
(0.29) (0.99) (0.44) 
ADF Stat 
1st diff 
No 
-3.18** -2.09 -5.19*** 
(0.03) (0.25) (0.00) 
ADF Stat 
1st diff 
Yes 
-3.10 -6.72*** -5.06*** 
(0.13) (0.00) (0.00) 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. P-values are in parentheses. The null hypothesis is the 
presence of a unit root. 
 
Results from an ECM test for cointegration are presented in Table 12. The coefficient estimate on 
the error correction term is negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level, indicating 
the presence of cointegration. Note that the coefficient on domestic demand is positive and 
statistically significant as well, which is consistent with economic theory. 
Table 12. ECM Estimation Results for Imports 
Constant 
0.00 
(0.03) 
Error Correction Term 
-0.53** 
(0.20) 
dlog(REER) 
0.54 
(0.35) 
dlog(Domestic Demand) 
0.12** 
(0.05) 
R-squared 0.44 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard errors are in parentheses. Bold numbers are 
statistically significant at the 5% level with expected signs. 
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Results of DOLS and FMOLS estimation of the import relationship are presented in Table 13. 
Estimates of the import elasticity with respect to the REER are 1.15 for the DOLS model and 0.82 
for the FMOLS model, with both estimates statistically significant at the 5 percent level. These 
estimates are close to that of 0.92 given in the IMF’s EBA-lite. The estimate of import elasticity 
with respect to domestic demand is 0.13 and statistically significant at the 5 percent level in both 
specifications. 
Table 13. DOLS and FMOLS Estimation Results for Imports 
Estimation Method DOLS FMOLS 
Constant 
-1.47 0.07 
(1.60) (1.41) 
log(REER) 
1.15*** 0.82** 
(0.37) (0.33) 
log(Domestic 
Demand) 
0.13** 0.13*** 
(0.05) (0.03) 
R-squared 0.80 0.68 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard errors are in parentheses. Bold numbers are 
statistically significant at the 5% level with expected signs. 
 
4.3 Marshall-Lerner Condition 
The Marshall-Lerner condition requires that the sum of the absolute values of export and import 
price elasticities exceed one. We find that even in a resource-rich economy like PNG, this 
condition is satisfied. Thus a depreciation of the PNG kina may be expected to result in an 
increase in the trade balance. 
5. COUNTER-FACTUAL SIMULATION ANALYSIS 
In the wake of the commodity price shocks of 2014, the PNG government adopted a fixed 
exchange rate regime with FX rationing. In this section, a counter-factual simulation analysis is 
conducted to project the consequences under an alternative flexible exchange rate policy. Based 
on our estimated elasticities and a calibration of our theoretical model (Equation [32]), we can 
calculate the impact of exchange rate adjustment on the trade balance and foreign reserves.
6
 
Specifically, we simulate the effects of a 10 percent real effective depreciation of the kina 
compared to the actual exchange rate path. The 10 percent figure is chosen because currently 
the kina is thought to be overvalued by 10 percent.
7
 In practice, the REER appreciated by 2.2 
percent during 2015-17 relative to 2014. Our counter-factual analysis thus postulates 
depreciation of the REER by 7.8 percent (10 percent minus 2.2 percent). Note that the year 2014 
was chosen as the baseline because the PNG economy was in a construction boom in 2013 due 
to development of a new LNG facility. To capture a more normal baseline, we chose 2014 as the  
                                                 
6
 The J-curve hypothesis holds that lagged effects of exchange rate depreciation differ from immediate effects, 
although empirical support for this is inconclusive (Bahmani-Oskooee and Ratha 2004). For our purposes, it does 
not matter since our simulated analysis uses long-run elasticities. 
7
 See the EBA-lite REER index model in the Box 1 of IMF (2017b). 
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benchmark year and compare activity for the following 3 years, 2015-17. The 3 year span is 
chosen because, as explained in the empirical section, that is the time needed for the lagged 
effect on agricultural production of a price change to play out. To mitigate any bias associated 
with a particular cointegration method, we use the average of exchange rate elasticities by DOLS 
and FMOLS estimators. 
To carry out the simulation, parameter values must be specified for the rates of dividend 
payment to foreign investors made by agricultural and mining firms, 𝛼𝑎 and 𝛼𝑚, respectively 
(Equation [22]). In many developing resource-rich economies, the foreign mining companies set 
relatively high rates of dividend payout to secure their profits (Katz-Lavigne 2017). In other words, 
the mining companies keep their profits offshore and bring FX into the country only to meet 
payment commitments such as covering operational expenses and taxes due. This practice is 
similarly followed by foreign logging companies in PNG, although not generally for agriculture 
where offshore accounts are less common. Based on the financial statements of various mining 
companies, we set 𝛼𝑚 = 0.4 for copper, 0.5 for gold and silver, and 1.0 for oil and logging 
companies, whereas for agriculture we adopt 𝛼𝑎 = 0. Also, only non-resource imports are 
assumed to respond to exchange rate movements because resource companies rely more on 
their own FX held in offshore accounts making them less sensitive to exchange rate movements. 
Table 14 shows the results of our simulation exercise. We find that a 10 percent real depreciation 
of the kina increases FX inflows via exports by $130 million and decreases FX outflows via 
imports by $200 million. On the whole, this yields an additional $330 million in foreign reserves. 
Further details of this effect are displayed in Figure 8, Scenario 1, which shows a contribution 
from agriculture and fishery exports of $28 million and from mining exports of $102 million, 
along with the $200 million from import reduction.  
 Table 14. Counter-Factual Simulation Results: 10% REER Depreciation of the PNG Kina 
 
2014 Volume 
Average Price in 
2015-17 
Exchange Rate 
Elasticity1 
Additional Volume 
Change 
Additional FX 
Change 
Foreign Shareholder 
Ratio2 (α𝑚, 𝛼𝑎)  
Actual FX 
Inflows 
(a) (b) (c) (d)=(a)×(-0.1)×(c) (e)=(d)×(b) (f) (g)=(e)×(1-(f)) 
Exports ― ― ― ― $190.2 million ― $129.9 million 
 
Gold 58.1 tons $39.3 million/ton -0.59 3.4 tons $134.7 million 0.5 $64.2 million 
Copper 89.6 thousand tons $5.5 thousand/ton -1.21 10.8 thousand tons  $59.8 million 0.4 $38.7 million 
Oil 8200 thousand tons $48.8 per barrel -0.07 57.4 thousand tons  $2.8 million 1.0 $0.0 million 
Silver 53.0 tons $0.5 million/ton 0.50 -2.7 tons  $-1.4 million 0.5 $-0.7 million 
Copra 48.2 thousand tons $0.6 thousand/ton 1.76 -8.5 thousand tons  $-5.1 million 0.0 $-5.1 million 
Cocoa 33.6 thousand tons $2.7 thousand/ton -0.38 1.3 thousand tons  $3.3 million 0.0 $3.3 million 
Coffee 48.4 thousand tons $3.6 thousand/ton -0.62 3.0 thousand tons  $10.8 million 0.0 $10.8 million 
Palm Oil 514.8 thousand tons $0.7 thousand/ton -0.05 2.6 thousand tons  $1.7 million 0.0 $1.7 million 
Rubber 3.2 thousand tons $1.6 thousand/ton -0.82 0.3 thousand tons  $0.4 million 0.0 $0.4 million 
Tea 2.1 thousand tons $1.4 thousand/ton -2.17 0.5 thousand tons  $0.6 million 0.0 $0.6 million 
Copra Oil 11.1 thousand tons $1.6/thousand/ton -1.86 2.1 thousand tons  $3.3 million 0.0 $3.3 million 
Logs 3800 thousand cubic meters $0.1 thousand/ton 0.98 -371 thousand cubic meters   $-33.4 million 1.0 $0.0 million 
Marine Products 78.2 thousand tons $1.2 thousand/ton -1.33 10.4 thousand tons  $12.7 million 0.0 $12.7 million 
 
 
2014 Value 
Average Price 
Change in 2015-17 
Exchange Rate 
Elasticity1 
Additional Value Change Additional FX 
Change 
Foreign Shareholder 
Ratio3 (α𝑚, 𝛼𝑎) 
Actual FX 
Outflows 
(h) (i) (j) (k)=(h)×(-0.1)*(j) (l)=(k)×(1+(i)/100) (m) (n)=(l)×(1-(m)) 
Imports $4510 million -27.3% 0.98 $-442.0 million $-321.2 million ― $-200.2 million 
 
Resource $1700 million -27.3% 0.98 $-166.6 million $-121.0 million 1.0 $0.0 million 
Non-Resource $2810 million -27.3% 0.98 $-275.4 million $-200.2 million 0.0 $-200.2 million 
 
 (o)=(e)-(l)  (p)=(g)-(n) 
Net Trade ― ― ― ― $511.4 million ― $330.1 million 
Note 1: The average of exchange rate elasticities based on DOLS and FMOLS estimators. 
Note 2: Fraction of FX inflows sent to offshore foreign currency accounts. 
Note 3: Fraction of FX used to finance imports from offshore foreign currency accounts. 
 
  
 Figure 8. Simulated Contributions to PNG Foreign Reserves by Source 
 
Scenario 1: 10 percent real depreciation of the kina relative to the actual exchange rate. 
Scenario 2: Scenario 1 plus closure of mining companies’ offshore foreign currency accounts (𝛼𝑚 = 0). 
 
Next, we consider a second hypothetical scenario in which the state-equity participation rate in 
mining projects is raised and foreign mining companies convert all their FX into domestic currency 
via trades with the central bank. In this case, there are no offshore accounts in mining industries. 
Figure 8 shows the total FX increase in Scenario 2 is $545 million, with an additional $94 million 
coming from mining exports and $121 million from the reduction in mining companies’ imports.  
In summary, if, as under Scenario 1, the flexible exchange rate had been adopted in PNG after the 
commodity price shock of 2014 and the currency had depreciated by 7.8 percent (compared to the 
actual 2.2 percent appreciation), foreign reserves at the end of 2017 would have been $2,050 million 
compared to the actual level of $1,718 million. Thus Scenario 1 shows an increase in foreign reserves 
of 19 percent over the actual outcome. If, as under Scenario 2, this currency depreciation was 
accompanied by closing the offshore FX accounts of mining companies, the reserves would reach 
$2,263 million at the end of 2017. This represents an increase of 32 percent over the actual outcome. 
6. POLICY DISCUSSION 
Which is the better policy regime, FX intervention with rationing under a fixed exchange rate or a 
flexible exchange rate? The pros and cons of each are weighed in Table 15. Consider, for example 
that on the one hand, currency depreciation will increase the price competitiveness of the export 
sector, while on the other it will increase the debt burden denominated in foreign currency (unless 
the exchange rate risk is fully hedged).  
Many factors weigh in favor of exchange rate flexibility. In particular, if the domestic currency 
depreciates as a shock absorber, profits of firms and associated tax revenues accruing to the 
government will increase in the domestic currency, hence balance in the fiscal budget is easier to 
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maintain. Further, if the central bank wishes to sustain precautionary foreign reserves as a buffer 
against future external shocks, a policy requiring FX intervention poses concern. Our counter-factual 
simulation analysis shows that foreign reserves in PNG would have been higher by about 20 percent 
if the country had adopted a currency depreciation policy in response to the negative commodity 
price shocks. Moreover, in the event of a depreciation in the domestic currency, the government can 
use capital gains from its foreign reserves for fiscal financing. Further, a currency depreciation raises 
the domestic price of imported goods, which induces expenditure switching (Equations [14] and [15]) 
from foreign goods to domestic goods. Towbin and Weber (2013) found that this effect of 
expenditure switching is stronger for countries with a small foreign currency debt and high exchange 
rate pass-through, which is the case for PNG, as a flexible exchange rate regime can insulate output 
better from a negative terms-of-trade shock compared to a fixed regime. Thus domestic industry 
and the government fiscal position tend to benefit from exchange rate flexibility. 
 
Table 15. Comparison of Two Exchange Rate Policies 
Pros (if Yes) and Cons (if No) 
FX Rationing with Fixed 
Exchange Rate 
Flexible Exchange 
Rate 
1. Import price stability as a nominal anchor Yes No 
2. Exchange rate stability without overshooting Yes No 
3. Minimizing opportunity cost of holding reserves Yes No 
4. Management of unhedged exchange rate risk Yes No 
5. Holding reserves as a buffer No Yes 
6. Competitiveness in export sector No Yes 
7. Absence of restriction on imports No Yes 
8. Market-clearing price mechanism No Yes 
9. Demand shift from imports to domestic goods No Yes 
10. Avoiding the need for internal devaluation No Yes 
11. Ease of implementation No Yes 
12. Independent monetary policy No Yes 
13. Less need for prudent fiscal consolidation No Yes 
14. Averting collapse of the exchange rate regime No Yes 
 
An argument against allowing the PNG currency to depreciate is that this may increase import prices 
and result in higher inflation. To assess the costs associated with currency depreciation, we would 
need further analysis of exchange rate pass-through into import and domestic prices. If the country 
has a large share of imported goods in its consumption basket, the inflationary impetus from 
currency depreciation can be non-negligible. In the PNG case, the degree of pass-through may have 
been reduced recently due to increased competition between wholesalers and retailers. Firms have 
absorbed the cost associated with currency depreciation by squeezing their margins and have more 
aggressively sought alternative cheaper inputs from either external or domestic sources. 
Ultimately, weighing of the pros and cons depends on the elasticity of exports and the relative size of 
foreign currency debt to exports (Nakatani 2017c). Our empirical analysis showed that for PNG both 
imports and commodity exports respond to real exchange rates, indicating that a depreciation of the 
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currency increases exports and decreases imports. This tends to incline the policy choice in favor of 
exchange rate flexibility. 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
This study developed a theoretical model in which a negative commodity price shock causes a BOP 
crisis. Such a shock lowers export revenues and inflows of FX, thereby resulting in a shortage of 
foreign reserves. To deal with this situation, two exchange rate policies — (i) FX rationing under a 
fixed exchange rate and (ii) a flexible exchange rate — are compared. Our model shows that FX 
rationing reduces consumer welfare by creating a shadow exchange rate premium that consumers 
implicitly face (Figures 6 and 7). The model also suggests that a flexible exchange rate policy, which 
allows for a depreciation of the domestic currency, may be superior if international trade responds to 
the real exchange rate. 
We found that export commodities in PNG – coffee, cocoa, copper, rubber, tea, etc. – have 
statistically significant supply elasticities with respect to the exchange rate. Our panel regression 
analyses show that the short-run (one-year) elasticity of exports to REER movement ranges between 
-0.3 and -0.7 depending on estimation methods. Cointegration regressions for each commodity 
support the finding of statistically significant export elasticities.
8
 Cointegration regressions by DOLS 
and FMOLS methods yield long-run elasticity estimates by commodity of between -0.5 and -2.3, 
suggesting much higher responsiveness over longer time horizons. Our estimates of import 
elasticities also indicate responsive to the exchange rate. The upshot is that if the kina had 
depreciated in real effective terms following the 2014 negative commodity price shock, export 
volumes and hence foreign reserves would have been substantially higher than the actual level after 
three years. Our counter-factual simulation of the outcome under a flexible exchange rate policy 
showed foreign reserves being higher by 20 percent relative to the observed outcome. 
Currency depreciation in response to negative commodity price shocks brings many benefits to the 
economy. First, as shown in our theoretical analysis, it lowers the costs of domestic currency 
components (such as local wages) in the balance sheets of foreign firms which are denominated in 
foreign currency (Equation [32]). Second, it can increase tax revenues in domestic currency as a result 
of higher profits of firms. Third, it may boost goods exports (as shown in our analysis), as well as 
potential service exports such as tourism which may be important for PNG given the country’s 
cultural diversity, untouched wilderness, and unique wildlife. Fourth, the PNG central bank is able to 
preserve foreign reserves as a buffer against future external shocks. Fifth, it induces expenditure 
switching from imported goods to domestic goods and encourages the development of domestic 
industry in the medium-term. Sixth, it restores the market-clearing price mechanism and diminishes 
delays in meeting import orders such as arise under FX rationing, which can hinder severely normal 
business and government activities. Seventh, it alleviates pressures on the fiscal budget and allows a 
more independent monetary policy. 
                                                 
8
 Lagged effects of exchange rates on commodity exports are further analyzed with an Autoregressive Distributed Lag 
model in Nakatani (2017a). 
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APPENDIX A 
Commodity Exporters Non-Commodity Exporters 
Algeria 
Australia 
Bahrain 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Brunei Darussalam 
Cameroon 
Canada 
Chad 
Chile 
Colombia 
Dem. Rep. of Congo,  
Republic of Congo,  
Ecuador 
Equatorial Guinea 
Gabon 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Guyana 
Indonesia 
Iraq 
Kazakhstan 
Kuwait 
Libya 
Mauritania 
Mexico 
Mongolia 
Mozambique 
Nigeria 
Norway 
Oman 
Papua New Guinea 
Peru 
Qatar 
Russian Federation 
Saudi Arabia 
South Africa 
Sudan 
Suriname 
Timor-Leste 
Trinidad and Tobago 
United Arab Emirates 
Venezuela 
Zambia 
Afghanistan 
Albania 
Angola 
Anguilla 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Argentina 
Armenia 
Aruba 
Austria 
Azerbaijan 
Bahamas 
Bangladesh 
Barbados 
Belarus 
Belgium 
Belize 
Bhutan 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Burundi 
Cabo Verde 
Cambodia 
Central African Republic 
China 
Comoros 
Costa Rica 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Djibouti 
Dominica 
Dominican Republic 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Estonia 
Ethiopia 
Fiji 
Finland 
France 
Gambia 
Georgia 
Germany 
Greece 
Grenada 
Guatemala 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Hungary 
Iceland 
India 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Jordan 
Kenya 
Korea 
Kosovo 
Kyrgyz Republic 
Lao 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Macedonia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Maldives 
Malta 
Mauritius 
Micronesia 
Moldova 
Montenegro 
Montserrat 
Morocco 
Myanmar 
Namibia 
Nepal 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Philippines 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Rwanda 
Samoa 
San Marino 
São Tomé and Príncipe 
Serbia 
Seychelles 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
Slovak Republic 
Slovenia 
Solomon Islands 
South Sudan 
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
St. Kitts and Nevis 
St. Lucia 
St. Vincent and Grens. 
Swaziland 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Tajikistan 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Tonga 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Uganda 
Ukraine 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
Vanuatu 
Vietnam 
West Bank and Gaza 
Zimbabwe 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Under the case of a fixed exchange rate with FX rationing, the household optimization problem 
results in a corner solution of 𝑌2
𝑖 = 𝑌2
𝑖,𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛. We demonstrate this for the case of a household utility 
function with constant elasticity of substitution. The utility function is given as: 
𝑈(𝐿𝑡
𝑎, 𝐿𝑡
𝑚, 𝑌𝑡
𝑎,𝑑 , 𝑌𝑡
𝑚,𝑑 , 𝑌𝑡
𝑖) =
𝐶𝑡
1−𝜎
1−𝜎
+ ℵ
(1−𝐿𝑡
𝑎−𝐿𝑡
𝑚)1−𝛾
1−𝛾
,                                     (B.1) 
where  σ > 0 and γ > 0, with total consumption then defined as:9 
𝐶𝑡 = {(𝑌𝑡
𝑎,𝑑)
𝜌
+ (𝑌𝑡
𝑚,𝑑)
𝜌
+ (𝑌𝑡
𝑖)
𝜌
}
1
𝜌
                                              (B.2) 
where −∞ < 𝜌 < 1, 𝜌 ≠ 0 and 
1
1−𝜌
 is the elasticity of substitutions among consumption goods. The 
first order conditions of the household optimization problem, based on Equations (14) to (18), are 
written as: 
(𝑌𝑡
𝑎,𝑑 𝑌𝑡
𝑖⁄ )
𝜌−1
= 𝑃𝑡
𝑎,𝑑 (𝑃𝑡
𝑖𝐸𝑡)⁄ ,                                                    (B.3) 
(𝑌𝑡
𝑚,𝑑 𝑌𝑡
𝑖⁄ )
𝜌−1
= 𝑃𝑡
𝑚 𝑃𝑡
𝑖⁄ ,                                                        (B.4) 
ℵ(1 − 𝐿𝑡
𝑎 − 𝐿𝑡
𝑚)−𝛾 {𝐶𝑡
−𝜎(𝑌𝑡
𝑎,𝑑)
𝜌−1
}⁄ = 𝑊𝑡
𝑎 𝑃𝑡
𝑎,𝑑⁄ ,                                     (B.5) 
ℵ(1 − 𝐿𝑡
𝑎 − 𝐿𝑡
𝑚)−𝛾 {𝐶𝑡
−𝜎(𝑌𝑡
𝑚,𝑑)
𝜌−1
}⁄ = 𝑊𝑡
𝑚 (𝑃𝑡
𝑚𝐸𝑡),⁄                                   (B.6) 
𝛽𝐶𝑡+1
−𝜎(𝑌𝑡+1
𝑎,𝑑)
𝜌−1
(1 + 𝑖𝑡 − 𝛿)𝑃𝑡
𝑎,𝑑 = 𝐶𝑡
−𝜎(𝑌𝑡
𝑎,𝑑)
𝜌−1
𝑃𝑡+1
𝑎,𝑑 .                               (B.7) 
If the government chooses FX rationing in response to the BOP crisis caused by the negative export 
price shocks, i.e., 𝑌2
𝑖 = 𝑌2
𝑖,𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, then the first order conditions above yield the following domestic 
demand equations for agricultural and mining goods, respectively: 
𝑌2
𝑎,𝑑 = (
𝑃2
𝑎,𝑑
𝑃2
𝑖𝐸2
)
1
𝜌−1
𝑌2
𝑖,𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛,                                                       (B.8) 
𝑌2
𝑚,𝑑 = (
𝑃2
𝑚
𝑃2
𝑖 )
1
𝜌−1
𝑌2
𝑖,𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛.                                                       (B.9) 
 
 
                                                 
9
 Note that σ=γ=1 corresponds to the case of more restrictive Cobb-Douglas utility function. A CES function is chosen 
in preference to a Cobb-Douglas function so as to illustrate the role of substitutability in policy discussion. 
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